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Abstract
To identify credit availability we analyze the extensive and intensive margins of lending with 
loan applications and all loans granted in Spain. We fi nd that during the period analyzed both 
worse economic and tighter monetary conditions reduce loan granting, especially to fi rms 
or from banks with lower capital or liquidity ratios. Moreover, responding to applications 
for the same loan, weak banks are less likely to grant the loan. Our results suggest that 
fi rms cannot offset the resultant credit restriction by turning to other banks. Importantly the 
bank-lending channel is notably stronger when we account for unobserved time-varying 
fi rm heterogeneity in loan demand and quality.
Keywords: non-fi nancial and fi nancial borrower balance-sheet channels, fi nancial accelerator, 
fi rm borrowing capacity, credit supply, business cycle, monetary policy, credit channel, net 
worth, capital, liquidity, 2007-09 crisis.
JEL classifi cation: E32, E44, E5, G21, G28.
Summary 
To identify credit availability, we analyze a uniquely comprehensive micro-dataset that 
contains monthly information from 2002:M2 to 2008:M12 on firms’ loan applications to 
their non-current banks. This dataset allows us to study the extension of credit to new clients 
(i.e., the extensive margin). We also analyze all business loans granted by all banks operating 
in Spain during the 1988:Q2 to 2008:Q4 period and study the change in loan volume to old 
clients (i.e., the intensive margin). To identify the impact of both non-financial and financial 
borrower balance-sheet channels, we match the loans with both firm and bank identity and 
complete balance-sheet data, including precise capital- and liquidity-to-total-assets ratios. 
These variables capture net worth and balance-sheet strength that determine the agency 
costs of borrowing for both firms and banks. The dataset is from Spain, a bank-dominated 
country with pronounced business cycles where the correlation between GDP growth and 
short-term interest rate changes is not strong, further enabling us to disentangle economic 
from monetary policy effects. 
On the extensive margin we find the following results: (1) Lower GDP growth or 
positive short-term interest rate changes reduce loan granting. (2) A decrease in firm capital 
reduces loan granting, but a decrease in bank capital or liquidity increases loan granting. (3) 
The negative effect of lower GDP growth or higher short-term interest rates on credit 
availability is stronger for both firms with low capital or liquidity and (independently) from 
banks with low capital or liquidity. Both the business cycle and monetary policy effects work 
strongly through the bank lending channel, while the level of firm capital plays a substantial 
role in channeling changes in GDP growth to changes in loan granting. Moreover, within the 
set of different applications for a loan from the same firm in the same month to different 
banks (i.e., keeping constant the quality of potential borrowers), we find that banks with low 
capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or short-term interest rates 
are higher. 
To analyze credit substitution by firms, we match – at the firm-time level – the loan 
applications with all the granted loans. We find that – conditioning on a firm’s need for 
funds – weak firms, and also average firms associated with banks with weaker capital 
or liquidity, have a higher probability of obtaining zero granted loans when economic and 
monetary conditions are tighter. Hence, the results suggest that loan supply restrictions are 
binding and cannot be fully offset by firms turning to other (stronger) banks. 
Finally, we analyze the intensive margin employing all the granted business loans in 
Spain during the last 20 years. This is important for several reasons. The intensive margin 
may be economically more significant than the extensive one, we can cover two business 
cycles, and using all granted loans may be better to analyze credit substitution by firms 
across different banks. To account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality 
shocks, we saturate the econometric model with firm-quarter fixed effects as in Khwaja and 
Mian (2008). Not only do we find evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel, 
we also show that the bank-lending channel is stronger if we account for unobserved 
time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan demand and quality. These findings suggest that an 
empirical analysis of the bank lending channel done at the bank level, as Kashyap and Stein 
(2000), significantly underestimate the strength of the bank lending channel. 
The datasets and empirical setting allow us to better disentangle loan demand 
and supply and firm and bank balance-sheet channels, thus allowing us to draw policy 
conclusions that are immediately relevant for the current financial crisis. In particular, our 
estimates have a direct bearing on the effects of the developing capital and credit supply and 
on the usefulness of monetary policy, recapitalizations and liquidity injections in banks and 
firms to ameliorate credit supply conditions, thus suggesting that exit strategies need to be 
carefully assessed. 
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1 Introduction 
The dramatic events unfolding in the global economy during the last few years have 
again highlighted the key role played by financial frictions for business cycle fluctuations. 
Observers and policy makers alike recurrently worry about weakening firm and bank balance 
sheets that may worsen the contractive impact of adverse economic and tight monetary 
conditions on the supply of credit. Many recapitalizations and liquidity injections later, 
and after an exceptionally expansionary monetary policy period, it is still unclear whether 
the unprecedented policies pursued by all major central banks and governments around the 
world have been adequate to soften the credit crunch.1 
But do adverse economic conditions and contractive monetary policy reduce both 
firm borrowing capacity and bank loan supply? And does the reduction in credit availability 
depend equally on firm versus bank balance-sheet strength [Bernanke and Blinder (1988), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1996)]?2 That is, do agency costs of borrowing 
between firms and banks and between banks and their financiers – proxied by both firm 
and bank capital- and liquidity-to-total-assets ratios as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) for example – make lending significantly more problematic during 
economic downturns or monetary contraction periods? 
To convincingly answer these questions three major identification challenges 
need to be addressed. First, “borrowers may be both balance-sheet constrained and 
bank-dependent” [Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)], and weak firms with low-quality balance 
sheets may therefore borrow more from weak banks.3 Hence, any analysis based only on firm 
(or bank) level data suffers from an omitted-variables problem. Moreover, firm and bank 
balance-sheet channels may be directly interrelated as tight monetary conditions may 
decrease borrower net worth, which may have a negative impact on bank net worth. 
Estimating both channels simultaneously is therefore essential, and this requires an 
analysis at the individual loan level of contract information coupled with both firm and bank 
characteristics. 
Second, the supply of credit needs to be disentangled from its demand [see 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)]. Low economic 
growth and tight monetary conditions may lower both loan demand and supply. Demand may 
fall because the expectations for investment are depressed and the cost of financing is high. 
                                                                          
1. Bernanke and Lown (1991) define a credit crunch as “a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for loans, 
holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers”. They further relate a credit 
crunch to a capital crunch and provide empirical evidence on the US economic crisis in the early 1990s. [also Peek and 
Rosengren (1995)]. Chari et al. (2008), Cohen-Cole et al. (2008), Huang (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2009), and Puri 
et al. (2009), among others, provide related evidence from the recent crisis. 
2. See also Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1987), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Stein (1998), Diamond and Rajan (2006), Matsuyama (2007), among others. Bernanke (2007) suggests that the bank 
lending channel is the (borrower) balance-sheet channel of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Bernanke 
et al. (1999) for banks that obtain funds from depositors, other debt-holders and equity holders. Hence, not only the 
agency problems between banks and their borrowers (firms and households) but also the agency problems between 
banks and their providers of funds matter. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) formalize the bank balance-sheet channel 
modeling financial intermediation as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) but include liquidity risk as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). 
3. In theory firm and bank balance-sheet strengths could be correlated: the higher the agency problems between 
firms and banks due to the firms’ moral hazard, the more fragile the banks will be [Diamond and Rajan (2001)]. Peek and 
Rosengren (2005) and Caballero et al. (2008) document that, during the Japanese financial crisis, banks with capital 
ratios closer to the minimum binding levels lent more to zombie firms. Hence, the strength of the lending banks’ 
balance-sheets was positively correlated with those of the borrowing firms. 
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Supply may contract because  as already indicated  the agency costs of borrowing may 
increase. 
Third, if country business cycle conditions completely determine short-term interest 
rate changes, which may be the case in many countries [e.g., through a Taylor (1993)-rule], 
separating the effects of monetary conditions from those of economic activity is problematic. 
Our main contribution to the literature consists in taking additional but crucial steps 
in addressing all three identification challenges at once. In particular, we analyze the effects of 
economic activity and monetary conditions on the availability of credit and account 
simultaneously for the strength of the firm and bank balance sheets. We use individual 
loan records on all granted business loans, including loan application records, from Spain, 
a country where most firms are bank dependent and where the correlation between GDP 
growth and short-term interest rate changes is not strong, further enabling us to disentangle 
economic from monetary policy effects. 
The empirical micro literature, which we review later, has been constrained by 
the unavailability of comprehensive loan-level data and, thus, has mainly addressed these 
challenges at the firm or bank level using credit aggregates [e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
for firms and Kashyap and Stein (2000) for banks]. In contrast we tackle these fundamental 
research questions at the loan level and rely on three unique features of the Credit Register of 
the Banco de España (CIR) to attain identification. First, the CIR database contains detailed 
monthly information on all, new and outstanding, loans (over 6,000 Euros) to non-financial 
firms granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain since 1984. The more than fifty million 
granted loans on record avert any concerns about unobserved changes in bank lending, 
which is important since economic or monetary conditions may influence bank lending to 
smaller firms for example [Lang and Nakamura (1995), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)]. 
We analyze this dataset to study the changes in the volume of lending to all clients, including 
those currently borrowing from the bank (i.e., the intensive margin). 
Loan applications are the CIR’s second unique feature. During the last seven years 
the CIR recorded all information requests lodged by banks. In total more than 2,350,000 
requests were filed. Because banks monthly receive information on all outstanding loans and 
defaults of their current borrowers, they will only file information requests following loan 
applications from firms that are currently not borrowing from them, in particular we observe 
each loan that is actually granted by a bank with the set of corresponding loan applications 
(i.e., the extensive margin). The loans granted to noncurrent borrowers surely do not involve 
simply the renewal or even evergreening of outstanding loans. 
Third, the CIR uniquely contains loan conditions and tracks key firm and bank 
characteristics, including identity. Therefore, both the granted loan and loan application 
datasets can be augmented with complete accounting information, including accurate 
measures of capital and liquidity. These are recorded monthly for banks since 1984 and 
yearly for firms since 1992. This feature of the CIR allows us to simultaneously control for 
and exploit firm and bank identity and accounting information, and relate the approval and 
granting of loans with firm and bank balance-sheet strength. 
The three unique features of the CIR allow us to improve identification. First, 
to disentangle firm and bank balance-sheet channels we study micro-data at the individual 
loan level matched with both complete firm and bank information [a course of action strongly 
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advocated by Kashyap et al. (1996)]. Not only do we control for both firm and bank variables, 
but also exploit theoretically motivated interactions between economic and monetary 
conditions on the one hand and firm and bank balance-sheet strength variables on the other 
to identify supply [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Kashyap and Stein (2000)]. 
The definition of the capital- and liquidity-to-total-assets ratios we employ closely follows the 
theoretical literature that attributes a prominent role to net worth in reducing the agency costs 
of borrowing, which sharpens the interpretation of the coefficients on their interactions with 
economic and monetary conditions.4 
Second, to separate bank loan supply from demand we study the extensive margin 
with loan applications and analyze whether economic and monetary conditions interacted 
with firm and bank balance-sheet strength affects the probability a loan is granted. Tackling 
the first and second identification challenges jointly, we further focus on the set of multiple 
loan applications that are made in one month by the same borrower to multiple banks of 
varying balance-sheet strengths (by including in the specifications firm-month or alternatively 
loan fixed effects). Within such a set of loan applications, for which the (observed and 
unobserved) quality of potential borrowers is constant as in the credit crunch definition by 
Bernanke and Lown (1991), we study how bank capital and liquidity affect the granting 
of loans. In addition, we analyze whether firms that get rejected in their initial loan application 
can undo the resultant reduction in credit availability by successfully applying to other banks. 
To identify loan supply when analyzing the intensive margin with all granted loans, 
we account for unobserved time-varying firm heterogeneity in loan quality and demand, 
by saturating the specification with firm-quarter fixed effects [as in Khwaja and Mian (2008)]. 
We identify the causal impact of the bank lending channel by showing that for the same firm 
borrowing from at least two different banks in the same quarter the amount borrowed 
from the weaker bank declines more when monetary and economic conditions are tighter. 
Third, to distinguish between the impact of real activity and monetary conditions, 
we rely on the observation that – since mid 1988 – the correlation between GDP growth and 
short-term interest rate changes has not been strong, further enabling us to disentangle 
economic from monetary policy effects. The monetary policy was basically coming first by the 
Bundesbank and then by the European Central Bank. Their mandates focused on price 
stability and the correlation of GDP growth (or Taylor-rule implied rates) between Germany 
(Euro Area) and Spain has never been strong. Moreover, the current recession that is taking 
place was partially triggered and/or worsened by financial and economic conditions abroad. 
The 1993 recession similarly came after a recession in the US and a significantly raise of 
monetary policy rates by the Bundesbank (which the Banco de España followed). 
In sum, our study is the first in the financial accelerator literature  as far as we are 
aware  to analyze loan applications (also matched with firm and bank information), to 
account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality, and to study a country 
with fairly exogenous monetary policy. Our study yields the following robust results. On the 
extensive margin using loan applications we find that: (1) lower GDP growth or positive 
short-term interest rate changes reduce the probability that a loan is granted. (2) A decrease 
                                                                          
4. The agency problem in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) for example depends on the level of capital over the total assets 
“as a borrower’s percentage stake in the outcome of an investment project increases, his or her incentive to deviate 
from the interests of lenders’ declines.” See also Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). 
By definition capital and liquidity ratios are liability- and asset-based respectively and are relevant for both firms 
and banks, in contrast to asset tangibility or wholesale to retail deposit ratios for example that are only relevant for either 
firms or banks, respectively. 
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in firm capital reduces loan granting, firm liquidity does not matter, while a decrease in bank 
capital or liquidity has a positive effect on loan granting. (3) The negative effect of lower GDP 
growth or higher short-term interest rate on loan granting is statistically stronger both for firms 
with low capital or liquidity and (independently) from banks with low capital or liquidity. 
All findings are robust to the inclusion of firm, bank and month fixed effects in 
different combinations. Within all the loan applications received by a bank in a month we find 
that firms with low capital or liquidity are less likely to get a loan when GDP growth is lower or 
short-term interest rate changes are higher. Moreover, within the set of applications made in 
the same month by the same firm to different banks, and within the set of different 
applications made for the same granted loan, we find that banks with low capital or 
liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or short-term interest rate changes 
are higher. The first evidence  we think  that clearly identifies that, under tighter economic 
or monetary conditions, bank capital and/or liquidity have a significant impact on credit supply 
[Bernanke and Lown (1991)]. 
However, loan applications have been available only during the last seven years and 
may not be fully representative in terms of the actual borrowing that takes place if firms 
end up borrowing from their current banks if their applications elsewhere (i.e., the ones we 
observe) fail. Three sets of exercises thoroughly address these potential limitations of the loan 
application dataset. First, we study only firms that are noncurrent for all banks, i.e., firms that 
do not have any bank loan outstanding at the time of the loan application. We find similar 
results. Second, we match the loan application dataset to the dataset of all loans granted in 
Spain and study only those firms that applied for loans and, hence, are in need of financing. 
We find that weaker firms and firms associated with weaker banks face a higher probability of 
obtaining no bank loans at all when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. The loan 
supply restriction is therefore binding and firms cannot offset it by turning to other banks 
where the acceptance probability may be lower in any case or by leaning more on their 
current banks. 
Finally, we analyze the impact of monetary and economic conditions on the intensive 
margin by employing all granted business loans in Spain during the 1988:Q2-2008:Q4 period. 
We find that the bank lending channel is both operative and potent. The channel is even 
stronger if we include firm-quarter fixed effects that account for unobserved time-varying firm 
loan demand and quality. This last finding suggests that an empirical analysis done at the 
bank level [as in Kashyap and Stein (2000)] significantly underestimates the relevancy of 
the bank lending channel, explaining why in contrast to most existing literature [Romer and 
Romer (1990), Ramey (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Angeloni et al. (2003) for 
example] our analysis documents its existence and potency. 
In sum, our results suggest that: (1) the strength of firm and bank balance-sheets 
plays an economically relevant role in channeling changes in GDP and short-term interest 
rates to credit availability; and (2) analyzing the bank lending channel at the bank level may 
crucially underestimate its importance because firm loan demand and quality are correlated 
with bank balance-sheet strength. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the 
literature highlighting the testable hypotheses from theory and the identification challenges 
from the empirical studies. Section III presents the database and discusses the empirical 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1030
strategy. Section IV explains the variables in detail, and presents and discusses the results. 
Section V concludes and discusses the policy implications. 
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2 Theory, Testable Hypotheses, and Empirical Work 
We first very briefly review the literature highlighting both the testable hypotheses emanating 
from theory and the identification challenges faced by the empirical studies [for recent 
literature reviews see Bernanke (2007) and Boivin et al. (2009)]. In standard models of 
lending with asymmetric information and/or incomplete contracting, the external finance 
premium depends inversely on the borrowers' net worth [see Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a 
review]. When borrowers have little wealth to contribute to the financing of their projects, 
the potential divergence of interests between the borrower and the suppliers of external 
funds is larger, increasing agency costs. In equilibrium, lenders must be compensated. 
As borrower net worth is pro-cyclical (because profits and asset prices are pro-cyclical), the 
external finance premium is countercyclical, amplifying the changes in credit availability 
and thus in investment, spending, and production [Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), 
Matsuyama (2007)]. In Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) the agency problems depend on the 
capital-to-total-assets ratio, in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) net worth is also 
associated with the liquidity of the assets. 
Since banks not only face agency problems with their borrowers, but banks 
themselves are also borrowing funds from their depositors and other financiers, bank net 
worth may determine their own agency costs of borrowing [Bernanke (2007), Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2009)]. The capital-to-total-assets ratio of the bank determines its own stake 
and incentive to exert effort to monitor in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Hence, higher bank 
capital implies easier access to finance for banks thus allowing more lending to firms for 
example. On the other hand, higher bank capital mechanically implies lower (short-term) 
debt for banks, softening their hard-budget constraint and decreasing their ability to provide 
liquidity and hence credit [Diamond and Rajan (2000)].5 
Finally, higher levels of short-term interest rates reduce borrowers’ net worth in turn 
worsening the agency problems between lenders and their borrowers [Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995)], both between firms and their banks, and also between banks and their financiers 
[Bernanke (2007)].6 
In sum, the testable hypotheses present in the aforementioned theory are: 
                                                                          
5. In addition, higher banks’ net worth or charter value also makes a “gambling for resurrection” strategy possibly 
involving excessive lending to riskier clients less attractive [Kane (1989), Hellman et al. (2000)]. However, banks with less 
capital and more illiquid assets have especially during bad times an incentive to increase their capital and liquidity, and 
restrict lending due to their fear of liquidity shocks, their own needs for future liquidity, and/or the potential use of liquidity 
for buying distressed assets in the market [Diamond and Rajan (2009)]. During bad times lower bank capital constrains 
lending because: (1) Wholesale depositors and bank investors demand higher levels of capital as a buffer for losses 
and to reduce bank moral hazard problems (see Iyer and Peydró (2009) for evidence), (2) bank incentives to monitor and 
screen new borrowers are lower [Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)], and (3) capital levels get closer to the regulatory limits. 
During normal times bank equity is considerably more expensive than bank short-term debt. During bad times the 
situation worsens, hence it may not be optimal or feasible for current bank shareholders to raise bank equity then. Banks 
with low levels of liquid assets similarly may try to increase their holdings of liquid assets during bad times, thus reducing 
new lending. 
6. Short-term interest rates may not only affect banks’ incentives for lending but also for risk-taking [Jiménez 
et al. (2008), Ioannidou et al. (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010)]. Angeloni and Faia (2009) integrate Diamond and 
Rajan (2000)-type banks that are exposed to runs into a standard DSGE model. They show that monetary contractions 
may reduce bank leverage and risk. 
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(H1) Loan supply is reduced by lower GDP growth and/or higher short-term interest 
rates.7 
(H2) Lower firm capital reduces firm borrowing capacity. Lower bank capital has an 
ambiguous effect on loan supply. 
(H3) The negative impact of lower GDP growth and/or higher short-term interest 
rates on loan supply is stronger for firms with low capital or liquidity, and from banks with low 
capital or liquidity. 
Due to the unavailability of comprehensive loan-level data, a large empirical literature 
mostly has investigated the firm and bank-balance sheet channels independently, with the 
analysis done at either the firm or the bank level. Moreover, the literature has tried to control 
for loan demand through some observed firm characteristics like industry or by interactions 
between economic/monetary conditions and firm/bank characteristics.8 However, as far as 
we are aware, and probably due to unavailability of data, no paper has so far employed 
comprehensive loan level data, has investigated simultaneously the effects of economic 
and monetary conditions working through both firm and bank-balance sheet channels, 
has analyzed loan applications, and has accounted for unobserved time-varying firm 
loan demand and quality by including firm-time fixed effects. In particular the usage of loan 
applications and firm-time fixed effects are crucial when identifying loan supply from demand. 
                                                                          
7. The testable implications emanating from a financial accelerator model are especially relevant during economic 
recessions or periods with a tightened monetary policy stance, but credit availability can also be linearly dependent on 
economic and monetary conditions. We test the latter implication without loss of generality. 
8. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) for example find that, following the dates of monetary 
contractions identified in Romer and Romer (1989), the ratio of bank loans to small versus large manufacturing firms falls. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that, even after controlling for differences in sales between these firms, the differences 
in the behavior of small and large firm debt remain. See also Lang and Nakamura (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1996). Bernanke and Blinder (1992) focus on the bank side. They find that a monetary contraction is followed 
by a significant decline in aggregate bank lending. To better control for loan demand, Kashyap and Stein (2000) analyze 
whether there are also important cross-sectional differences in the way that banks respond to monetary policy shocks. 
They find that, following a monetary contraction, small banks with liquid balance sheets cut their lending less than other 
small banks. See also Kishan and Opiela (2000), Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Ashcraft (2006) and Black et al. (2009), 
among others. Khwaja and Mian (2008) examine the drop in lending by different banks to similar firms following shocks 
to banks’ liquidity that are induced by unanticipated nuclear tests in Pakistan. Banks pass their liquidity shortages to 
firms, but firms with strong business or political ties can turn to alternative sources in the credit market [see also 
Gan (2007)]. 
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3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
In the previous two Sections we have discussed the three main identification challenges 
when analyzing whether – and through which channels – economic and monetary conditions 
affect loan supply. In this Section we discuss the data we employ in our empirical work to 
tackle these identification challenges. 
A. Loan Applications 
All banks in Spain automatically receive monthly updated information on the total current 
credit exposures and (possible) loan defaults  vis-à-vis all other banks in Spain  of their 
own current borrowers. This information is extracted from the Credit Register of the Banco 
de España (CIR). Any bank can also request this information on potential borrowers, which 
are defined as “any firm that seriously approaches the bank to obtain credit.” The monetary 
cost of requesting this information is zero. But a Law stipulates that a bank cannot ask for the 
information without consent by the potential borrower, indicating a seriousness of intent 
regarding the “financial relationship between bank and firm.” 
We observe all requests for information on potential borrowers between 2002:M02 
and 2008:M12 (before 2002 the requests were not stored). Though the requests can be 
made at any time, they are collated monthly and uniquely link borrowers with banks. 
Requests for information on firms that are currently borrowing from the requesting bank 
would yield information that is already known to this bank. Consequently, requesting 
information from the CIR is especially useful if the firm has never before received a loan from 
the bank (that is requesting the information) or when the relationship between the firm and the 
bank ended before. In this way, the information requests focus our analysis on a key category 
of borrowers that do not simply renew or even evergreen existing loans at their current bank, 
but that seek new loans from another bank (i.e., the extensive margin).9 
Between 2002:M02 to 2008:M12 we observe more than 2,350,000 bank requests 
for information. For each request we also observe whether the loan is accepted and granted, 
or not, by matching the loan application database with the CIR database, which contains 
the stock of all loans granted. Therefore, if multiple banks request information on a 
particular borrower in the same month, we can infer the bank that granted the loan and 
the banks that did not. In case a bank requests information but does not grant the loan, 
either the bank denied the firm credit or the firm perceived the offered conditions by the 
bank to be less attractive than those of the loan it eventually took. Hence, we can link loan 
granting for the same firm within a month to bank balance-sheet strength. 
                                                                          
9. Since we cannot observe firm loan applications to their current banks, we later on also study only firms that do not 
have any bank loan outstanding at the time of the loan application. These firms are noncurrent for all banks and hence 
we have the loan applications from all the banks. Notice that approximately one fifth of the loans to borrowers entirely 
new to the bank are granted without any information request on record during the last sample quarter. This statistic 
shows that while the monetary cost of requesting the information is zero, non-pecuniary costs may not be. For example, 
an information request may slight borrowers (whose consent is required), involves waiting, uses management time 
processing the information, and/or may result in a loss of reputation vis-à-vis the Banco de España if prospects turn idle. 
Especially for the very good or connected borrowers that don’t take a “check-and-wait” for an answer or during 
economic expansions when capacity constraints at the bank become binding, these non- pecuniary costs may be 
relevant. Banks may further not request information about the largest firms for example because these firms 
deal with many banks, are well-known, and/or do not seek regular loans. For all these reasons and for completeness 
we also study all the actual loans granted to all firms when analyzing the intensive margin. 
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We match the application dataset with firm and bank datasets, so that we have 
balance-sheet information for each firm that applies for a loan and for each bank that receives 
a loan application and/or grants a loan. The firms’ dataset is available from the Spanish 
Mercantile Register at a yearly frequency starting in 1992. The banks’ dataset, at a monthly 
frequency starting in 1984, is owned by the Banco de España in its role as banking 
supervisor. We can match more than 800,000 loan applications. As we have the loan 
applications plus firm and bank characteristics, in particular their capital and liquidity ratios as 
measures of their balance sheet strength, we are able to better disentangle the demand 
from the supply of loans. Through the loan applications, loan demand for each bank is in a 
sense given and observed, and each bank has to decide only on the granting of each loan 
 “its loan supply”  knowing the firm characteristics. To absorb variation in loan demand 
and supply quality over the business and monetary policy cycles, we include a wide array 
of firm and bank characteristics, including their identity (fixed effect), capital, liquidity, assets, 
age, and profitability for example. As far as we are aware, ours is the first paper that analyzes 
the impact of business cycle and monetary conditions on the probability of loans being 
granted following applications. 
Then, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
we exploit the cross-sectional implications of the sensitivity of credit availability to economic 
and monetary conditions according to the strength of the firm and bank balance sheets. 
Following the theoretical literature we focus on net worth and liquidity. Because of lack of 
data, most other studies had to rely on size or debt as a proxy for net worth. Following 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) we define net worth  both for firms and for banks  as the 
capital-to-total-assets ratio.10 Following Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Gertler and 
Kiyotaki (2009) we also feature a liquidity measure for both firms and banks. The 100,000 
firms and 200 banks active in the loan application dataset provide ample cross-sectional 
variation in both measures. 
We control for time-invariant differences in the quality of applicants by including firm 
fixed effects and, in some regressions, we also control for differences across banks and time 
periods by including bank and month fixed effects. To identify loan supply contractions 
[Bernanke and Lown (1991)], we analyze the success of the loan applications made in the 
same month by the same firm to multiple banks that differ in capital and liquidity and within 
all loan applications received for the same loan by multiple banks. We also analyze variation 
within all loan applications received in the same month by the same bank to assess how 
firm capital and liquidity affect bank loan granting following changes in economic and 
monetary conditions. 
Finally, since firms may shift their applications between banks of different balance 
sheet strengths possibly neutralizing the supply effect measured with loan applications, 
we match the loan application dataset to the dataset that contains all loans granted in Spain 
(see below) and  at the firm level  study only those firms that applied for loans and hence 
are in need of financing. We then analyze whether weaker firms face different likelihood of 
obtaining bank loans at all when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. 
 
                                                                          
10. Off-balance sheet volumes are very small in Spain. Hence, total bank assets cover most of the banks’ businesses. 
Banks did not develop conduits or Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) because the prevailing accounting rules made 
banks consolidate these items and set aside sufficient capital. 
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B. All Loans Granted 
 
We also analyze the records on all granted business loans for the extended 1988:Q2 to 
2008:Q4 period because with the loan application dataset we can only analyze the extensive 
margin, i.e., the information requests follow loan applications by firms that are currently not 
borrowing from the bank. Loan applications are also only recorded since 2002. 
For these purposes, we employ the information in the CIR which contains 
confidential and very detailed information at the loan level on virtually all commercial and 
industrial (C&I) loans granted to all non-financial publicly limited and limited liability companies 
(that account for around 95% of all firms) by all commercial banks, savings banks and credit 
cooperatives (that account for more than 95% of the entire Spanish financial system) 
operating in Spain. The CIR is almost comprehensive, as the reporting threshold for a loan is 
only 6,000 Euros. Given that we consider only C&I loans, this threshold is very low which 
alleviates any concerns about unobserved changes in bank credit to small and medium sized 
enterprises (which may be more influenced by changes in business cycle and monetary 
policy under the credit channel theory for example).11 As before, we match CIR data compiled 
at a quarterly frequency with complete bank balance-sheet variables and exploit relevant 
interactions between business cycle conditions and bank balance-sheet strength.12 
To account for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks we 
saturate the specification with firm-year:quarter (which we shorthand as firm-quarter) fixed 
effects as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). As explained in the Introduction, our identification 
therefore entirely comes from firms that at least once in their history borrow from two different 
banks during the same quarter. Not only do we want to test the existence of the bank 
lending channel, but also whether it is correlated with firm demand and balance-sheet 
channels. This is a key test to shed light on whether it is possible to investigate the 
credit channels at the firm or bank level [as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap and 
Stein (2000)], or if it is imperative to test them at the loan level. 
C. Economic and Monetary Conditions 
Separating the effects of economic activity from monetary conditions on bank lending is 
generally difficult as short-term interest rate changes are determined by the business cycle 
(as in a Taylor-rule). We start from the observation that – since mid 1988 – the correlation 
between GDP growth and short-term interest rate changes has not been strong in Spain, 
which enables to disentangle economic from monetary policy effects [see Banco de España 
(1997) and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008)]. Spain formally joined the European 
Monetary Mechanism in 1989, informally in mid 1988, after joining the European Union in 
1986. Monetary conditions consequently became basically set first through the fixed 
exchange rate policy with the Deutsche Mark and as of January 1, 1999, within the 
Eurosystem. 
                                                                          
11. See e.g. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996). The Credit Register contains more than 2,400,000 loans in the last month of 2008. 
The commercial and financial loans we study in this paper represent 82.6% of all loans that are granted (excluding 
leasing, factoring and other specialized loans). Incomplete coverage of the widely used U.S. (National) Survey of Small 
Business Finances or Loan Pricing Corporation datasets for example may complicate any analysis of bank credit 
provision. 
12. Before 1992 we can match each loan to selected firm characteristics, i.e., identity, industry, location, the level of 
credit and default. For loans to households, in all time periods, a very limited set of characteristics is available. Given the 
focus of our paper, we therefore study only the loans that were granted to firms. 
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Moreover, GDP growth in Germany and Spain were only weakly synchronized during 
the last twenty years. For example, during the period 2002-2005 short-term interest rates 
were low given the slow economic growth in Germany, Italy and France (the three larger Euro 
area economies). But potentially these rates were less fitting Spain’s much higher economic 
growth rates. Consequently, there is a significant exogenous variation in short-term interest 
rates allowing us to disentangle its effects from those of local Spanish economic activity. 13 
The current recession in Spain, in addition, was partly initiated by the financial 
crisis abroad, providing a modicum of exogeneity to its start. The European Central Bank also 
did not decrease its policy rates as much as the Federal Reserve, partly because its main 
mandate is to ensure price stability. However, the economic contraction in Spain has been 
severe. In less than two years time Spain’s unemployment rate for example more than 
doubled, from eight to almost twenty percent (2007:Q2 to 2009:Q3). 
As explained above, given the previous paragraphs and that our purpose in this 
paper is to control better for loan demand and analyze the credit channel, we use simple 
measures of economic and monetary conditions: GDP growth and short-term interest rate 
changes. In addition, to complete our specifications we include inflation as an important 
economic determinant of short-term interest rates in all specifications. Robustness exercises 
feature month, bank-month or firm-month fixed effects to control for other macroeconomic 
factors. 
                                                                          
13. Since 1999, monetary policy is set for the euro area as a whole, with Spain being a part of the euro area, but 
entering only with its relative weight (less than 15% of the euro area output). 
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4 Dependent Variable, Independent Variables and Results 
We first analyze in detail the extensive margin with the set of business loan applications 
introducing all loan, firm, bank and macro variables, and then analyze the intensive margin 
with the dataset on all granted business loans. 
A. The Extensive Margin with Loan Applications 
1. Main dependent variable: LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 
Table 1 defines the dependent and independent variables employed in the first set of 
empirical specifications (reported in Tables 2 to 3) as well as their descriptive statistics. 
The dependent variable we feature first is LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED (we recurrently 
shorthand this as “loan granting”), which equals one if the loan application by firm i at time t is 
approved by bank b and the loan is granted in month t to t+3, and equals zero otherwise 
(results are unaffected if the loan is granted in t to t+1 or in t to t+2). 
We also match each loan application with its relevant firm and bank characteristics. 
In the main regressions we include firm fixed effects, naturally restricting the sample to firms 
that filed at least one application that did not result in a loan and one application that 
did during the sample period (with an average value equal to 43.0 percent, see Table 1). 
In robustness we will analyze all loan applications and the dependent variable then equals one 
for all firm-month combinations with one or more granted loans and equals zero otherwise. 
2. Independent Variables 
As independent variables we include an array of macroeconomic conditions and firm/bank 
characteristics to control for changes in the quality and the propensity during the business 
cycle of different type of firms to apply for loans to a potentially varying set of banks that 
request information and approve the loans. 
a) Macroeconomic Conditions 
As macroeconomic conditions we include annual GDP growth, a short-term interest rate 
measure of the annual changes in monetary policy conditions and the inflation rate. According 
to Hypothesis 1 (H1) we expect the coefficient on GDP growth to be positive and the 
coefficient on the interest rate to be negative. GDP growth, 'GDP, is available only quarterly, 
while both the interest rate changes and the inflation rate are measured monthly. Hence, 
to be consistent with the other macroeconomic measures, we interpolate GDP growth for all 
intermediary months (results are unaffected if we do not interpolate). Thus defined, GDP 
growth averages 3.14 percent and varies between -0.85 and 3.98 percent. 
Our measure for the changes in monetary conditions, 'IR, is the change in the 
Spanish 3-month interbank interest rate during the last year. The average change in 
the 3-month interest rate during the sample period was 0.23 percent, ranging between -1.56 
and 1.41 percent. The use of variations in the short-term interest rate as a measure that 
proxies the change in the stance of monetary policy is fully in line with the literature analyzing 
the credit channel at the micro level.14 Our main results are unaffected if we employ the level 
                                                                          
14. See Jayaratne and Morgan (2000), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Kishan and Opiela (2000), Ashcraft (2006) and 
Black, Hancock and Passmore (2009) among others. On the other hand, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano 
et al. (1996) use vector auto regressions to identify monetary policy shocks. But Kashyap and Stein (2000) find very 
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rather than the changes in this interest rate. The use of a 3-month interest rate is in line with 
many articles in Angeloni, Kashyap and Mojon (2003) for example that also use European 
data. Using the changes in the overnight interbank interest rate yields very similar results, 
not surprisingly as the correlation between the two series equals 0.95. Finally, the average 
inflation rate, 'CPI, during the sample period was 3.33 percent, with the minimum and 
maximum were 1.43 and 5.27 respectively. 
b) Firm Characteristics 
The composition of the pool of borrowers may change over time and different firms may 
have different degrees of success in obtaining loans from banks. To control for these 
demand-side effects, we include a broad set of firm characteristics in most specifications also 
firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics, in robustness 
replaced by all-encompassing firm-month and loan fixed effects to control for time-variant 
unobservable firm characteristics. The summary statistics of Table 1 are based on the 
observations used in the regressions with firm fixed effects. Firm balance-sheet data is taken 
at the end of the previous year (t-1) and firm credit related information over the previous year. 
We employ lagged values as economic and monetary conditions may determine the capital 
and liquidity ratios firms and banks optimally choose. 
The key firm balance-sheet variables are the CAPITAL RATIO measuring the firm’s 
net worth and the LIQUIDITY RATIO capturing its liquidity position (to distinguish them clearly 
from their corresponding bank ratios in later exercises we add FIRM in their label). According 
to Hypothesis 2 (H2) we expect the sign of the coefficients of both variables to be positive. 
The capital ratio is defined as the ratio of own funds over total assets of the firm and has 
an average value of 22.5 percent. Given the skewness of its distribution we employ the 
natural logarithm of the ratio in all regressions, but assess its economic relevancy in levels. 
The liquidity ratio is the current assets over total assets of the firm. It has an average value 
of 41.6 percent. 
As other firm characteristics we include controls for firm risk: Ln(TOTAL ASSETS), 
the log of the total assets of the firm in 2008 Euros; Ln(1+AGE), the log of one plus the age of 
the firm in years; ROA, the return on assets of the firm; I(DOUBTFUL LOANS AT THE TIME 
OF THE REQUEST), a dummy variable that equals one if the firm had doubtful loans the 
month before the loan was requested, and equals zero otherwise; I(DOUBTFUL LOANS 
BEFORE THE TIME OF THE REQUEST), a dummy variable that equals one if the firm had 
doubtful loans any time previous to the month before the loan was requested, and equals 
zero otherwise; Ln(1+No. MONTHS WITH THE BANK), the log of one plus the number of 
months that the firm had a working relationship with the bank (i.e., has outstanding loans 
with the bank; though the firm currently does not borrow from the bank as we are analyzing 
borrowing from new banks, the firm may have previously borrowed from the bank); and 
Ln(1+NUMBER OF BANK RELATIONSHIPS), the log of the number of bank relationships 
of the firm. 
As an industry characteristic we include INDUSTRY DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO, 
which is the doubtful loan ratio of the industry in which the firm operates to control for the 
probability of loan rejections over the business cycle in the industry of the firm. As a province 
characteristic, we include Ln(No. BANKS) which is the log of the number of banks in the 
province where the firm is located (a province in Spain roughly corresponds to a Metropolitan 
                                                                                                                                                 
similar results using either the variation in the federal funds rate, the Boschen and Mills (1995) index or the Bernanke and 
Mihov (1998) measure. 
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Statistical Area in the United States). Many firms borrow from local banks [Petersen and 
Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005)] so this variable controls for the number of 
banks that a firm may approach. The variable also partially captures the intensity of local bank 
competition. 
c) Bank Characteristics 
The key bank balance-sheet variables we are interested are the bank’s CAPITAL RATIO as a 
measure of the bank’s net worth and the LIQUIDITY RATIO as a measure of its’ liquidity 
position. The capital ratio is defined as the ratio of core capital over total assets of the bank 
[as in Bernanke and Lown (1991) for example]. Core capital is defined as total equity plus 
retained earnings. As we use the book value of equity and assets are not risk adjusted, 
our measure is equivalent to a pure leverage ratio. Thus defined it has an average value of 
5.4 percent. Unlike in the US there is no regulated minimum leverage ratio in Spain, hence its 
minimum is very low. As with firm capital we take its natural logarithm but results are similar 
without this transformation. 
The LIQUIDITY RATIO is the ratio of liquid assets held by the bank (i.e., cash and 
deposits with central banks and other credit institutions, and public debt with a maturity up to 
one year) and the total assets of the bank. Banks on average held almost 17 percent of their 
balance-sheet in liquid assets. 
Lending behavior may vary across banks, hence we control for bank variables that 
may affect bank lending and in robustness also feature bank fixed effects. We therefore 
include: Ln(TOTAL ASSETS), the log of the total assets of the bank in 2008 euro; ROA, 
the return on assets of the bank; DOUBTFUL LOANS RATIO, the doubtful loan ratio of the 
bank; and the HERFINDAHL BY INDUSTRY, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the bank’s 
credit portfolio by industry. 
3. Results 
Our empirical exercises assessing the extensive margin of lending are structured as follows: 
we first focus on the impact of economic and monetary conditions ('GDP and 'IR) and, 
second, and more importantly, on the interactions between the economic and monetary 
conditions and the strength of the firm and bank balance sheets – proxied by CAPITAL RATIO 
and LIQUIDITY RATIO. The regressions are at the loan application level and we match the 
loan application outcomes (whether the loan is granted or not) with the associated 
macroeconomic, firm, industry, province, and bank information. 
We control – and exploit – the strength of the balance sheets of both the firms and 
the banks associated with each loan application. Firm fixed effects allow us to compare 
lending to the same firm under different economic and monetary conditions and for different 
bank strength. Taking an additional step towards identification we compare loan granting 
within the set of applications made by: (a) different firms in the same month to the same bank; 
(b) the same firm in the same month to different banks; and (c) the same firm for the same 
loan to different banks. In (a) the quality of the lending banks is held constant, whereas in (b) 
and (c) the quality of the potential pool of borrowers is held constant. 
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a) Economic and Monetary Conditions 
Table 2 reports for the baseline conditional logit model (i.e., a logit that controls for firm 
fixed effects) the estimated coefficients, between parentheses the standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level, and the corresponding significance levels. 
We start analyzing the direct effects of economic and monetary conditions 
on the probability that the LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED. Following Hypothesis 1 (H1) 
we expect the estimated coefficient on 'GDP to be positive as loan granting (corresponding 
improving firm and bank balance-sheet strength) increases with GDP growth. And following 
positive short-term interest rate changes we expect loan granting to decrease as agency 
costs of lending would increase. Hence we expect the coefficient on 'IR to be negative. 
In Table 2 we indeed find that GDP growth spurs loan granting while short-term 
interest rate hikes reduce loan granting. The semi-elasticity column indicates that both effects 
are also economically relevant. At the mean of all variables, a one standard deviation increase 
in GDP growth (from 3.14 to 4.07 percent), for example, increases the loan granting 
probability by almost 12 percent (from 43 to 48 percent), while a one standard deviation 
increase in the short-term interest rate variation (from 0.23 to 1.05 percent) decreases the 
loan granting probability by three and a quarter percent (from 43 to 41 percent). 
We note that the estimated coefficients on GDP growth and the change in the 
interest rate are obtained in specifications that include a comprehensive set of firm and bank 
characteristics, and firm fixed effects. These variables absorb changes in loan demand quality 
over the business cycle, i.e., changes in the pool of applicant firms that apply for and obtain 
loans from different banks, and changes in the balance sheet strength of banks. We also add 
the number of loan applications to key specifications, its growth rate declines during the 
recession, but results are virtually unaffected (in addition, the month, bank-month, firm-month, 
or loan fixed effects added later will also absorb variation in the propensity to apply).15 
In sum, controlling for firm and bank characteristics, we find that loan granting 
increases in good times, i.e., when GDP growth is higher and the cost of financing (short-term 
interest rate) is lower. Theory of the firm and bank balance-sheet channels predict the effects 
we have found so far, but also predict that these effects will work mainly through the 
strength of balance-sheet of firms and banks respectively. However we first now discuss 
the coefficients on the firm and bank characteristics once and then turn back to the focus of 
our study which are the effects of the changes in economic (and monetary) conditions 
through the strength of the balance sheets of firms (and banks) on loan granting. 
b) Firm and Bank Characteristics 
The estimated coefficients on the firm characteristics are overall and across all specifications 
statistically significant, economically relevant, stable and in line with straightforward priors. 
These results suggest therefore that these controls are at once needed and relevant. 
Applications from firms with a higher capital ratio are more likely to be successful. Therefore, 
we find clear support for Hypothesis 2 (H2). The coefficient on firm liquidity is not significant, 
but it becomes significant in models where liquidity is also interacted with economic and 
                                                                          
15, During periods of adverse economic or monetary conditions the firms’ propensity to apply may decrease in response 
to tightening bank lending standards [Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008)]. Weaker firms likely anticipate an even lower probability of 
loan approval during these periods. Consequently weaker firms may apply less, the pool of applicants may become 
better and therefore our estimates should be conservative. 
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monetary conditions (Tables 3 and 4). This indicates liquidity matters especially for firms that 
lack it when growth is low and short-term interest rates are high. 
Loan applications from larger, older and more profitable firms, from firms with fewer 
doubtful loans at or prior to the loan application or from an industry with a lower doubtful 
loan ratio, and from firms with longer and fewer bank relationships located in a province with 
many banks are also more successful. Hence, ceteris paribus more transparent firms with a 
stronger balance-sheet and with a longer and more impeccable track record can rely more 
on external financing [as in Jensen and Meckling (1976)], as so can firms with stronger 
and bilateral relationships in competitive banking markets [see Freixas and Rochet (2008) and 
Degryse et al. (2009) for reviews of theory and empirical evidence]. 
Regarding bank characteristics, more solvent and liquid banks are less prone to lend 
to new borrowers. Riskier banks (i.e., with higher NPL ratios and more industry concentrated 
loan portfolios) have a higher probability of granting loans to new borrowers. These results 
are further robust to the inclusion of firm-month or loan application fixed effects for example 
(unreported). Therefore, either using capital and liquidity ratios or other measures of bank 
strength, we find a clear negative sign when assessing Hypothesis 2 (H2). This result 
potentially hints to a type of behavior where lowly capitalized banks may have larger 
incentives to take more risk (see again the aforementioned reviews). 
Overall, we find these estimated coefficients in line with theory and their statistical 
significance and stability reassuring for our investigation of the different credit channels (as the 
working of these channels require the imperfect substitutability between external and internal 
financing that is especially acute for small and opaque firms and for small banks). 
c) Firm and Bank Balance Sheet Channels 
Table 3 analyzes the impact of both economic and monetary conditions on loan granting 
through both firm and bank balance sheet channels. As argued before, the simultaneous 
assessment of both channels is necessary to avoid an omitted-variables problem. Table 3 
therefore includes the interactions of both GDP growth and the change in the short-term 
interest rate with firm and bank capital and liquidity ratios suggested by Hypothesis 3 (H3).16 
Model I in Table 3 contains our benchmark regression. As explained in the previous 
Sections, GDP growth and interest rate changes are not highly correlated in Spain because 
of the relatively low level of synchronization of economic activity in Spain vis-à-vis the largest 
euro area countries, even after 1999 [Giannone et al. (2008)]. This allows us to exploit 
simultaneously the variation in output and monetary conditions interacted with firm and bank 
capital and liquidity. 
The estimates in Model I suggest that the negative effect of lower GDP growth or 
positive changes in the short-term interest rate on the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION 
IS GRANTED is stronger for firms with low capital or liquidity and (independently) for banks 
with low capital or liquidity.17 To put it differently, “weaker” firms or banks are more 
                                                                          
16. In unreported specifications we exclude various combinations of economic and/or monetary conditions and firm 
and/or bank capital and liquidity (and their interactions). Results are mostly unaffected in terms of statistical significance 
though not always in terms of their economic relevance. 
17. The ordinarily reported standard errors and marginal effects of interacted variables in non-linear models require 
corrections [Ai and Norton (2003), Norton et al. (2004)]. For the benchmark model we calculate the corrected standard 
errors and marginal effects based on the above papers, and alternatively linearize the benchmark model and estimate it 
using ordinary linear squares. In both cases the results are very similar to the standard (i.e., non-corrected) non-linear 
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pro-cyclical (in GDP or interest rate) in terms of loan granting than stronger ones. For zero 
changes in GDP and the interest rate, the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTED is lower for firms with low capital or liquidity and from banks with low capital 
or liquidity.18 Hence overall H3 is confirmed. 
In Figure 1 we further explore the economic relevance of these estimated effects. 
We plot the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED 
for a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth ('GDP) or in the change in the 
short-term interest rate ('IR) for values in the 25th to 75th percentile ranges of the FIRM and 
BANK CAPITAL RATIO (the values of both ratios are displayed in levels in the Figure). 
The effect of a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth on the probability that a LOAN 
APPLICATION IS GRANTED is always sizeable and around 12 percent, but fairly equal across 
the changes in firm and bank capital ratios, although the effect of firm capital ratio on GDP 
growth is slightly higher. When both firm and bank capital ratios are high (75th percentile) 
the effect is 9 percent, when both are low (25th percentile) the effect is 16 percent. 
The effect of a one standard deviation increase in the change in the short-term 
interest rate, on the other hand, depends mostly on the bank capital ratio. At the 25th 
percentile of the firm capital ratio, the effect varies between -3.5 percent for highly capitalized 
banks and -7.5 percent for lowly capitalized banks. This finding suggests that  in contrast to 
changes in GDP growth that work through both firm and bank balance sheet channels  
monetary policy changes work predominantly through the banking lending channel. Findings 
for FIRM and BANK LIQUIDITY are similar (Figure 2). Both GDP growth and interest rate 
changes now work only through the bank channel, highlighting the important role played 
by bank liquidity and the bank balance sheet channel in general. 
d) Various Effects Models 
We now present the estimates of various fixed effects models in the rest of Table 3.19 
In Model II we add bank and month fixed effects to the firm fixed effects. Bank fixed effects 
capture the still-unaccounted-for bank heterogeneity that is fixed over time. Month fixed 
effects capture the changes in economy-wide conditions, such as current and future 
expectations of GDP growth, inflation and interest rates and general shocks affecting 
the economy. Hence, all variables at the country level are dropped from the empirical model 
and the identification entirely comes from the interactions. The estimated coefficients are 
similar to those in Model I, except for the coefficient on the interaction between the interest 
                                                                                                                                                 
model estimates, not surprising as the mean of the dependent variable is close to 0.5. Hence we report the ordinarily 
reported non-linear estimates. 
18. The coefficient on bank liquidity is not statistically significant however. If bank capital is pro-cyclical, we may 
underestimate the total impact of current economic and monetary conditions on lending since adverse economic 
and tight monetary conditions, by reducing bank capital, may further decrease credit availability. See also Adrian and 
Shin (2009), Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Shin (2009) for example on the importance of overnight rates for bank 
liquidity and behavior. In unreported specifications we also add interactions of firm with bank capital and firm with 
bank liquidity and, in addition, interact also those two terms with GDP growth and interest rate changes respectively. 
None of the estimated coefficients on the latter four interactive terms is statistically significant however, suggesting that, 
when economic and monetary conditions are tight, weaker banks cut lending across the board, including lending to 
strong firms. 
19. In an unreported specification we replace in Model I the firm by region and industry fixed effects. Firm fixed effects 
absorb unobservable firm heterogeneity that is fixed over time and that may determine firm capital and liquidity for 
example if it is not accounted for by other controls. But including firm effects removes all firms with loan applications that 
were always or never granted within the sample period from the sample. By dropping the firm effects these firms re-enter 
the sample and the number of loan applications in this sample increases to 816,852. The estimated coefficients on firm 
size, age and number of bank relationships reverse sign (from Model I) demonstrating the importance of controlling for 
time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity (see also Model III). However, the estimated coefficients on the interactions 
remain very similar, except for the coefficient on the interaction term between the interest rate changes and firm capital 
which is no longer statistically significant (but it was already small economically speaking in Model I). 
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rate changes and firm liquidity which is no longer statistically significant (this interaction was 
economically not very relevant in Model I) and the coefficient on the interaction between the 
interest rate changes and bank capital which reduces in absolute size. The latter finding is not 
surprising as the largest part of variation of bank capital is between but not within banks. 
Model III drops firm fixed effects and saturates the model with bank-month fixed 
effects, i.e., and instead of adding up bank and month fixed effects we multiply them. 
We replace the firm by region and industry effects to make estimation possible. The firms with 
loan applications that were always or never granted therefore re-enter the sample and the 
number of loan applications increases to 813,115. We find that, within all the loan 
applications received by a bank in a month, firms with low capital or liquidity are less likely 
to be granted a loan when GDP growth is lower. 
In Model IV we include firm-month fixed effects (but no other effects). A firm-month 
fixed effects model accounts for the impact on loan granting of all observed time-varying 
firm characteristics (e.g., firm size and credit rating) and unobserved time-varying firm 
characteristics such as firm risk, quality, investment opportunities, the strength of the firm’s 
bank relationships, and access to market finance [Petersen and Rajan (1994), among others]. 
Hence all the independent firm characteristics and macro variables and their interactions have 
to be dropped from the model. In addition, to be included in the regression a firm must 
have filed more than one loan application in the same month, reducing in turn the number 
of observations to 155,167. All estimated coefficients are similar to Model I. In addition, in 
Model V we present estimates from a loan fixed effects model, where the 134,445 loan 
applications are included that resulted in a granted loan and for which multiple applications 
were filed. Again, results are very similar to both Models I and IV. 
In sum, Models IV and V show that within the set of applications made in the same 
month by the same firm to different banks and resulting in at least one granted loan, and 
within the set of different applications made for the same granted loan, banks with low capital 
or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or short-term interest rate increases 
are larger.20 Assuming that the very small changes in firm quality that occur during each 
month are not correlated with the quality of the approached banks  which is the case for 
example if firm quality is constant within each month  our results imply that under tight 
conditions (i.e., a recession or tight monetary policy) a lower capital level has an impact on 
credit supply. This is a key result since Bernanke and Lown (1991) define credit crunch as 
“a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for loans, holding constant both the safe real 
interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers” (our italicizing). As far as we are aware 
we are the first to identify and document in such a clear-cut way (i.e., it is the same firm 
that do apply at the same time or for the same loan to several banks) the occurrence of this 
phenomenon. 
e) Loan Applications from Current Borrowers 
Our estimations so far focused on the probability that loan applications from noncurrent 
borrowers get approved (i.e., the extensive margin). However, firms may initially apply 
to banks they currently don’t borrow from, but if their applications fail return to their current 
lenders to obtain new loans there. These “applications of last resort” with current lenders 
will not trigger information requests because lenders automatically obtain monthly information 
                                                                          
20. The coefficient on the interaction between GDP growth and bank liquidity is no longer statistically significant 
at standard levels. 
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from the CIR on all their current borrowers. Not including such applications may bias 
our findings. To address this potential problem, Model VI studies lending to all borrowers 
without any outstanding bank debt (hence borrowers without any current lender) and Table 4 
analyzes all lending to all borrowers that applied for a loan, key to assess potential credit 
substitution by firms that get rejected by some banks. 
The estimation in Model VI is based on 33,345 firms that have no bank debt 
outstanding at t-1. The number of firm-month observations equals only 42,029, suggesting 
that most firms are without bank debt for only one month (these are therefore most likely new 
firms). Firm fixed effects are therefore impossible, so we include region and industry fixed 
effects. The coefficients on the interaction terms confirm the existence of a bank balance 
sheet channel. 
f) Credit Substitution: Loan Applications and All Granted Loans 
Matching the loan application dataset to all granted loans in Spain, Table 4 presents 
estimates of conditional logit models of whether a firm gets (a) loan(s), conditioning on the firm 
having applied for (a) loan(s) reflecting its need for financing. The dependent variable is now 
AT LEAST ONE LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED which equals one if firm i applies for at 
least a loan at time t and one or more loans are granted from any bank in month t to t+3, and 
equals zero if firm i applies for at least a loan at time t but did not obtain any loans from any 
bank in t to t+3. 
This new dependent variable defined as granted loans per applying firm and month 
in effect “expands” the previous dependent variable LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED that 
was confined to loan applications per firm – mont – bank. Moreover, the granted loans 
to the firm can now come from either their non-current banks, which request information 
from the CIR when the firm applies, or from their current banks, which do not request any. 
The mean for this new dependent variable is higher than for the variable employed in Table 1 
(61% versus 43%), because some firms that did not obtain loans from the non-current banks 
can obtain them from their current banks. 
The independent variables in Table 4 are the same as those in Table 3, with one 
exception: bank characteristics are now those of the average bank the firm either borrows 
from or gets rejected by (including the current banks). Table 4 displays three representative 
models: one without interactions, one with interactions, and one with interactions and month 
fixed effects (we also include firm fixed effects in all models). 
Overall, and despite the use of the average bank characteristics, results are quite 
similar to those in Tables 2 and 3. Conditioning on their need for financing, firms with low 
capital or liquidity that try to borrow from non-current banks or are associated with current 
banks with low capital or liquidity ratios have a lower probability of obtaining loans during 
tighter economic or monetary times. Hence, even average firms associated to weak banks 
have a higher probability of not obtaining a single granted loan despite their need for funds. 
Hence, the results suggest that loan supply restrictions are binding and cannot be fully offset 
by firms turning to other banks. 
B. The Intensive Margin with All Granted Loans 
The set of loan applications we have used so far are loan applications during the period 
2002:M02 – 2008:M12 to banks from firms that try to borrow from them and which are 
currently not customers (i.e., the extensive margin of lending). We now extend the analysis 
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to the set of all granted loans for the period 1988:Q2 to 2008:Q4 (during which there 
were two economic recessions) and study the intensive margin of lending to account for 
changes in loan amounts and maturities. We match the granted loans with bank balance 
sheets and income statements culled from the monthly bank reports collected by the Banco 
de España.21 
This extended sample offers a worse environment for disentangling loan supply 
from demand. Firms may not have new loans in a quarter either because they did not borrow, 
or because they tried to borrow but their loan applications were all rejected, or because the 
loan conditions offered by the banks were not attractive enough. Consequently there is a 
problem identifying loan supply from demand and a positive (negative) coefficient of GDP 
(interest rates) on granted loans may be due to a higher loan demand or a higher loan supply, 
or both. 
However, we identify loan supply through a difference-in-difference exercise. Since 
the firm channel and loan demand is a firm-level shock, we do the analysis at the loan level, 
using all granted loans, controlling for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality 
shocks by including firm-quarter fixed effects as in Khwaja and Mian (2008). In this way 
identification is possible by comparing changes in credit for the same firm in the same quarter 
by banks with different levels of capital and liquidity ratios over the business cycle. If for 
example a firm that borrows from at least two banks starts obtaining less credit from the 
weaker vis-à-vis the stronger bank(s) when monetary and economic conditions are tighter, 
then such a result would suggest that it is the bank lending channel and not the firm loan 
demand or quality (channel) that is causing the changes in credit. Since we have access to all 
granted loans, we can perform this exercise. 
Not only do we want to test the existence of the bank lending channel, but also 
whether the bank-lending channel is correlated with firm demand and balance-sheet 
channels. We can do this by comparing the results on the bank lending channel between 
the models with and without firm-quarter fixed effects. This is a key test to shed light on 
whether the credit channel should be tested at the firm or bank level or if one needs to test 
for the presence of the bank lending channel employing loan level data. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables 
employed in the sample of granted loans (representing 20% of all loans and randomly 
drawn on the basis of tax identification numbers to steer clear of computational constraints). 
The dependent variable ƃLN(LOAN CREDIT) is the change in outstanding credit of firm i 
granted by bank b during quarter t. Its average value equals -0.01, with a standard deviation 
equal to 0.48. As independent variables in the models we include as much as possible the 
same macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics we employed when analyzing 
loan applications. 'GDP has an average value of 3.28 percent, the average 'IR is -0.36 
percent, and the average 'CPI is 3.64 percent. The average BANK CAPITAL RATIO is 
6.10 percent and the average BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO is 25.93 percent. 
                                                                          
21. Starting in 1992 we can match loan contracts with complete firm characteristics. Non-reported regressions that 
include all firm variables that were also employed in the loan application exercises corroborate the relevance of both 
firm and bank balance sheet channels for loan granting. Because Spanish monetary policy basically became decided 
in Frankfurt in 1988 [see Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2008)] and because an important economic recession 
started in Spain in 1992, we only present the estimates from the longer 1988-2008 time-period. As firm-quarter fixed 
effects will absorb the impact of firm balance-sheet and loan demand channels, we can still identify loan supply 
(the bank lending channel) and, in addition, we can test whether the firm channel is correlated or not with the bank 
lending channel (i.e., whether an analysis done at the bank level under- or overestimates the potency of the bank lending 
channel). 
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Table 6 presents the estimated models. Given our focus on the interaction between 
business cycle and bank balance-sheet strength variables, we cluster the errors in bank-time. 
We present four models: Model I does not feature any fixed effect, while Models II, III and IV 
include quarter, firm, and firm-quarter fixed effects, respectively. Model IV fully accounts for 
unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks, i.e., the firm loan demand and 
balance sheet channels.22 
The first column shows results similar to those on the extensive margin in Table 2. 
Higher GDP growth or lower short term interest rates imply more granted loans. These results 
could still be due to both higher loan demand and/or higher loan supply. In addition, we find 
that the effects of economic and monetary conditions are stronger for banks with lower 
capital and liquidity ratios, similar to the results we reported in Table 3. In Model II we control 
for firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant firm loan demand and quality shocks. 
We find statistically similar but economically stronger results as compared to Model I. Hence 
controlling for loan demand strengthens the bank lending channel. However, as explained 
above, loan demand volume and firm net worth may react to the business cycle. 
In Model III we introduce time fixed effects to focus on the micro interactions. We find 
that bank capital still channels output and monetary changes. But, more importantly, when 
we control for firm-quarter fixed effects in Model IV (and hence account for all time-varying 
firm loan demand and quality shocks) the estimated coefficients on bank capital significantly 
increase in absolute size. Hence, not only do we identify the existence of a bank channel but 
its economic significance increases when we control for firm loan demand and balance-sheet 
channels. 
In sum, we find evidence for the existence of a strong bank lending channel. 
The bank-lending channel strengthens if we control for firm-quarter fixed effects that account 
for unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality. This last result implies that 
empirical analysis of the bank lending channel done at the bank level [following the seminal 
paper by Kashyap and Stein (2000)] may significantly underestimate the strength of the bank 
lending channel. This may explain why in contrast to most of the literature we find evidence 
for the existence of a strong bank-lending channel. 
                                                                          
22. Regressions that include firm-quarter fixed effects require that firms that at least once in their history borrow 
from two different banks during the same quarter. Given our focus on Model 4, we employ this set of firms in Models I 
to III as well. However, the bank lending channel similarly exists if we study the universe of all loans with these three 
specifications (to conserve space we choose not to report these results). 
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5 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Do business cycle fluctuations and the stance of monetary policy affect credit supply? And, 
if so, how relevant are the firm versus the bank balance-sheet channels both for the business 
cycle and for monetary policy? These questions are not only key for macroeconomics in 
general but also for handling of the current crisis in particular. However, to answer these 
questions there are three main identification challenges: (1) An economic downturn and/or 
high cost of short-term financing may reduce both loan supply and demand. (2) Separating 
firm from bank balance-sheet channels creates an identification challenge since firms with 
low balance-sheet strength that are more bank dependent may borrow more from banks 
with low balance-sheet strength. (3) Separating the effects of economic activity and monetary 
conditions is also problematic as short-term interest rate changes may be completely 
determined by the business cycle. 
Our contribution to the literature lies in meeting these three identification challenges. 
We use a uniquely and comprehensive micro-dataset on loans that contains: (1) for the last 
seven years all monthly information requests by banks following loan applications from firms 
that are currently not borrowing from them; and (2) for the last twenty years, information on all 
granted loans to non-financial firms by all credit institutions. This dataset helps us to separate 
loan supply from demand, and firm from bank balance-sheet channels. The dataset is from 
Spain, a bank-dominated country with pronounced business cycles and a fairly exogenous 
monetary policy. 
We analyze the extensive margin of lending with loan applications and find the 
following results: (1) Lower GDP growth or positive short-term interest rate changes reduce 
loan granting. (2) A decrease in firm capital reduces loan granting, but a decrease in bank 
capital or liquidity increases loan granting. (3) The negative effect of lower GDP growth or 
higher short-term interest rates on credit availability is stronger for both firms with low capital 
or liquidity and (independently) from banks with low capital or liquidity. Both the business 
cycle and monetary policy effects work strongly through the bank lending channel, while the 
level of firm capital plays a substantial role in channeling changes in GDP growth to changes 
in loan granting. 
Moreover, within the set of different applications for a loan from the same firm in the 
same month to different banks (i.e., keeping constant the quality of potential borrowers), 
we find that banks with low capital or liquidity grant fewer loans when GDP growth is lower or 
short-term interest rates are higher.  
To analyze possible credit substitution by firms we match the loan level application 
data with all granted loans. We find that weak firms in need of funds, and also average firms 
associated with banks with weaker capital or liquidity, have a lower probability of obtaining a 
loan when economic and monetary conditions are tighter. Loan supply restrictions, our results 
therefore suggest, are binding and cannot be fully offset by firms turning to other banks. 
Finally, we analyze the intensive margin of lending by using all business loans 
that were granted in Spain during the last 20 years. To account for both observed and 
unobserved time-varying firm loan demand and quality shocks we saturate the specification 
with firm-quarter fixed effects. Not only do we find a significant bank lending channel, but we 
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also find that the bank-lending channel is stronger if firm-quarter fixed effects are included. 
Our results therefore suggest that any empirical analysis of the bank lending channel done 
at the bank level may significantly underestimate the strength of the bank lending channel. 
In sum, our results suggest that the levels of firm and bank balance-sheet strength 
play an economically relevant role when channeling changes in GDP and short-term interest 
rates to credit availability, and that one may underestimate the potency of the bank lending 
channel when analyzing it at the bank level because firm loan demand and quality are 
correlated with the bank balance-sheet strength. 
Improved identification makes the interpretation of the reduced-form coefficients 
more reliable. Our policy conclusions further have an immediate bearing on the current 
financial and economic crisis. First, the contracting effects of a slowdown in economic activity 
or a tightening of monetary policy on the supply of bank loans may be amplified by low firm 
and bank capital. Second, for the easing monetary policy to increase credit availability, 
especially bank capital matters. Frictions between banks and their financiers may have further 
gained in prominence as banks increasingly turned from core deposit to wholesale funding. In 
a low credit supply environment and with weakly capitalized banks it is therefore more difficult 
and risky than ever for monetary policy to “exit” from a low level of the short-term interest rate 
as loan supply reductions may be severe. Finally, firm and bank recapitalizations and liquidity 
injections will in principle increase the supply of bank loans. But the way in which this balance 
sheet strengthening is executed (e.g., central bank lending to banks) may affect the credit 
expansion. We leave this conjecture for future research. 
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FIGURE 1. FIRM AND BANK CAPITAL RATIO AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The figure plots the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED for a one 
standard deviation increase in GDP growth ('GDP) or a one standard deviation increase in the change in the 
short-term interest rate ('IR) for values in the 25th to 75th percentile range of firm and bank CAPITAL RATIO, 
based on the estimates in Table 3 Model I. All variables are otherwise set equal to their mean. The sample 
period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. 
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FIGURE 2. FIRM AND BANK LIQUIDITY RATIO AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING  
The figure plots the percentage change in the probability that a LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTED for a one 
standard deviation increase in GDP growth ('GDP) or a one standard deviation increase in the change in the 
short-term interest rate ('IR) for values in the 25th to 75th percentile range of firm and bank LIQUIDITY 
RATIO, based on the estimates in Table 3 Model I. All variables are otherwise set equal to their mean. The 
sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. 
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The table lists the variables employed in the first set of empirical specifications and provides their unit, definition, mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles and maximum. The number of observations equals 560,020 for all variables. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. All monetary amounts are in 
thousands of 2008 Euros (000 EUR). 
 
  
Units Definition Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Dependentvariable
LOANAPPLICATIONISGRANTEDibt 0/1 =1iftheloanapplicationbyafirmis approvedandtheloanis
grantedbyabank,=0otherwise
0.43 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPt % Annual changeofSpanishgross domesticproductinreal terms 3.14 0.93 Ͳ0.85 2.95 3.42 3.78 3.98
ȴIRt % Annual changeofSpanish3Ͳmonthinterbankinterestrates 0.23 0.82 Ͳ1.56 Ͳ0.40 0.28 1.04 1.41
ȴCPIt % Annual changeofSpanishConsumerPriceIndex 3.33 0.78 1.43 2.67 3.40 3.93 5.27
Firmcharacteristics(i)
Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofthecapital ratioofthefirm 2.68 1.08 Ͳ5.79 2.09 2.85 3.46 4.61
FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1 % Theratioofownfunds overtotal assetsofthefirm 22.51 18.82 0 8.06 17.35 31.85 100
FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 % Theratioofcurrentassets overtotal assets ofthefirm 41.60 26.30 0 19.34 39.03 61.19 100
Ln(TOTALASSETSitͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofthetotal assets ofthefirm 7.53 1.55 0.88 6.49 7.46 8.49 15.50
TOTALASSETSitͲ1 000EUR Thetotal assets ofthefirm 7,771 41,573 2 657 1,736 4,881 5,392,372
Ln(1+AGEitͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofoneplus theageofthefirm 2.14 0.84 0 1.61 2.20 2.77 4.89
AGEitͲ1 years Theageofthefirm 10.62 9.41 0 4 8 15 132
ROAitͲ1 % Thereturnonassets ofthefirm 6.32 8.87 Ͳ36.07 2.39 4.92 8.77 63.16
I(DOUBTFULLOANSATTHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) 0/1 =1ifthefirmhaddoubtful loansthemonthbeforetheloanwas 
requested,=0otherwise
0.01 0.09 0 0 0 0 1
I(DOUBTFULLOANSBEFORETHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) 0/1 =1ifthefirmhaddoubtful loansbeforetheprevious monthto
theloanwas requested,=0otherwise
0.10 0.30 0 0 0 0 1
Ln(1+No.MONTHSWITHTHEBANKibtͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofoneplus thedurationoftherelationshipbetween
firmandbank
0.63 1.37 0 0 0 0 5.63
No.MONTHSWITHTHEBANKibtͲ1 months Thedurationoftherelationshipbetweenfirmandbank 7.93 23.67 0 0 0 0 278
Ln(1+NUMBEROFBANKRELATIONSHIPSibtͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofthenumberofbankrelationships ofthefirm 1.50 0.63 0 1.10 1.39 1.95 4.63
NUMBEROFBANKRELATIONSHIPSibtͲ1 Ͳ Thenumberofbankrelationships ofthefirm 4.49 3.84 0 2 3 6 102
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Industrycharacteristics(s)
INDUSTRYDOUBTFULLOANSRATIOst % Thedoubtful loanratiooftheindustryinwhichthefirm
operates
0.91 0.60 0.06 0.43 0.73 1.31 4.91
Provincecharacteristics(p)
Ln(No.BANKSpt) Ͳ Thelogofthenumberofbanks intheprovincewherethefirm
is located
4.72 0.29 2.40 4.51 4.72 5.00 5.19
No.BANKSpt Ͳ Thenumberofbanksintheprovincewherethefirmis located 116.94 32.45 11 91 112 148 179
Bankcharacteristics(b)
Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofthecapital ratioofthebank 1.61 0.46 Ͳ9.71 1.39 1.57 1.80 4.15
BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1 % Theratioofbankequityandretainedearnings overtotal 
assetsofthebank
5.35 2.09 0.00 4.00 4.82 6.02 63.15
BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 % Theratioofl iquidassets(cashanddeposits withcentral 
banks andothercreditinstitutions,andpublicdebtwitha
maturityuptooneyear)heldbythebankoverthetotal assets 
ofthebank
16.93 8.07 0.04 11.02 15.74 21.84 92.07
Ln(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) Ͳ Thelogofthetotal assets ofthebank 17.35 1.45 9.57 16.40 17.55 18.51 19.90
TOTALASSETSbtͲ1 000,000EUR Thetotal assets ofthebank 75,158 86,207 14 13,198 41,752 108,940 437,240
ROAbtͲ1 % Thereturnonassets ofthebank 0.94 0.55 Ͳ8.93 0.67 0.90 1.12 11.92
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 % Thedoubtful loanratioofthebank 0.84 0.85 0.00 0.34 0.57 0.97 31.24
HERFINDAHLBYINDUSTRYbtͲ1 % TheHerfindahlͲHirschmanindexofthebank's creditportfolio
byindustry
26.70 9.01 12.77 20.11 23.51 31.40 87.94
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TABLE 2. CONDITIONS AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The estimates this table lists are based on a conditional logit model. The dependent variable is LOAN 
APPLICATION IS GRANTEDibt which equals one if the loan application in month t by firm i is approved by 
bank b and the loan is granted, and equals zero otherwise. The definition of the other variables can be found in 
Table 1. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 
2008:M12. The coefficients are listed in the first column and standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
between parentheses in the second column. Significance levels are in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. The semi-elasticity column reports the percentage change in the 
probability when the variable of interest increases by one standard deviation. 
 
Coefficient S.E.
SemiͲ
elasticity
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPt 22.465 0.622 *** 11.91
ȴIRt Ͳ6.978 0.742 *** Ͳ3.25
ȴCPIt Ͳ0.064 0.440 Ͳ0.03
Firmcharacteristics(i)
Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) 0.256 0.038 *** 2.64
FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 Ͳ0.024 0.029 Ͳ0.14
Ln(TOTALASSETSitͲ1) 0.023 0.011 ** 7.14
Ln(1+AGEitͲ1) 0.078 0.022 *** 3.95
ROAitͲ1 0.315 0.056 *** 1.59
I(DOUBTFULLOANSATTHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.452 0.051 *** Ͳ25.73
I(DOUBTFULLOANSBEFORETHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.173 0.039 *** Ͳ9.86
LN(1+No.MONTHSWITHTHEBANKibtͲ1) 0.029 0.003 *** 4.86
Ln(1+NUMBEROFBANKRELATIONSHIPSibtͲ1) Ͳ0.747 0.016 *** Ͳ36.37
Industrycharacteristics(s)
INDUSTRYDOUBTFULLOANSRATIOstͲ1 Ͳ5.495 1.047 *** Ͳ1.88
Provincecharacteristics(p)
LN(No.BANKSptͲ1) 0.511 0.069 *** 8.07
Characteristicsofthebank(b)
Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) Ͳ0.474 0.036 *** Ͳ2.29
BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ0.296 0.047 *** Ͳ1.36
LN(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) 0.011 0.003 *** 0.70
ROAbtͲ1 0.699 0.594 0.22
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 1.364 0.500 *** 0.66
HERFINDAHLBYINDUSTRYbtͲ1 0.227 0.048 *** 1.17
FirmFixedEffects yes
No.Observations 562,020
No.ofClustersandLevelofClustering 106,466 Firms
SamplePeriod 2002.M2Ͳ2008.M12
Logpseudolikelihood Ͳ236,579.05
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TABLE 3. CONDITIONS, CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY, AND THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The estimates this table lists are based on conditional logit models. In Model IV borrowers whose loan applications were always accepted or rejected during the sample 
period are also included. In Model VI only borrowers with outstanding bank debt in the previous month are included. The dependent variable is LOAN APPLICATION IS 
GRANTEDibt which equals one if the loan application in month t by firm i is approved by bank b and the loan is granted, and equals zero otherwise. The definition of the 
other variables can be found in Table 1. Subscripts indicate the time of measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. For each model 
coefficients are listed in the first column and standard errors, clustered at the firm (I to II), firm-month (III), loan (IV) or bank-month (V) level, or not clustered (VI), are 
between parentheses in the second column. Significance levels are in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
 
I II III IV V VI
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPt 62.851 2.365 *** 50.015 15.047 ***
ȴGDPt*Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) Ͳ24.483 3.559 *** Ͳ26.116 2.252 *** Ͳ17.290 1.478 *** Ͳ0.417 8.369
ȴGDPt*Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) Ͳ54.424 3.742 *** Ͳ23.991 4.272 *** Ͳ50.290 5.550 *** Ͳ53.827 5.915 *** Ͳ73.347 31.363 **
ȴGDPt*FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 Ͳ6.503 1.756 *** Ͳ6.382 1.743 *** Ͳ3.877 1.235 *** Ͳ2.627 6.843
ȴGDPt*BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ20.748 6.045 *** Ͳ19.533 6.632 *** Ͳ11.000 9.122 Ͳ11.037 9.846 Ͳ56.559 32.199 *
ȴIRt Ͳ64.210 2.868 *** Ͳ28.784 11.392 **
ȴIRt*Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) 12.865 2.743 *** 13.653 2.446 *** Ͳ0.004 1.412 1.172 6.530
ȴIRt*Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) 92.856 5.941 *** 17.871 6.142 *** 91.555 9.207 *** 89.109 9.841 *** 46.997 23.781 **
ȴIRt*FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 4.316 1.973 ** 2.632 1.989 2.032 1.242 Ͳ0.690 5.232
ȴIRt*BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 77.687 6.728 *** 49.428 6.991 *** 64.552 10.314 *** 60.917 11.040 *** 20.595 22.742
ȴCPIt 0.372 0.441 Ͳ1.417 1.771
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Firmcharacteristics(i)
Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) 1.075 0.081 *** 1.116 0.083 *** 0.640 0.048 *** Ͳ0.002 0.273
FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 0.175 0.061 *** 0.184 0.062 *** 0.301 0.040 *** 0.059 0.223
Ln(TOTALASSETSitͲ1) 0.029 0.011 *** 0.041 0.011 *** Ͳ0.205 0.003 *** Ͳ0.112 0.008 ***
Ln(1+AGEitͲ1) 0.080 0.022 *** 0.144 0.024 *** Ͳ0.023 0.004 *** Ͳ0.125 0.013 ***
ROAitͲ1 0.335 0.056 *** 0.336 0.056 *** 0.098 0.025 *** Ͳ0.125 0.064 *
I(DOUBTFULLOANSATTHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.437 0.051 *** Ͳ0.438 0.051 *** Ͳ0.632 0.029 ***
I(DOUBTFULLOANSBEFORETHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.156 0.039 *** Ͳ0.135 0.039 *** Ͳ0.101 0.009 *** Ͳ0.322 0.065 ***
Ln(1+No.MONTHSWITHTHEBANKibtͲ1) 0.031 0.003 *** 0.033 0.003 *** 0.082 0.002 *** 0.048 0.006 *** 0.052 0.006 *** 0.205 0.008 ***
Ln(1+NUMBEROFBANKRELATIONSHIPSibtͲ1) Ͳ0.744 0.016 *** Ͳ0.725 0.016 *** 0.285 0.006 *** Ͳ0.163 0.035 ***
Industrycharacteristics(s)
INDUSTRYDOUBTFULLOANSRATIOstͲ1 Ͳ5.275 1.048 *** Ͳ6.674 1.111 *** Ͳ7.226 0.821 *** 0.069 4.244
Provincecharacteristics(p)
Ln(No.BANKSptͲ1) 0.542 0.069 *** 0.504 0.071 *** Ͳ0.138 0.016 *** Ͳ0.409 0.059 ***
Bankcharacteristics(b)
ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) 0.512 0.106 *** 0.469 0.131 *** 0.422 0.156 *** 0.506 0.166 *** 1.269 1.030
BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 0.245 0.201 0.483 0.233 ** Ͳ0.303 0.296 Ͳ0.223 0.321 0.908 1.052
Ln(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) 0.000 0.003 Ͳ0.120 0.037 *** Ͳ0.005 0.004 Ͳ0.012 0.005 *** Ͳ0.025 0.009 ***
ROAbtͲ1 2.746 0.608 *** Ͳ0.316 0.868 6.577 1.064 *** 6.681 1.138 *** Ͳ3.154 1.929
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 2.128 0.511 *** 0.131 0.719 1.137 0.777 0.976 0.834 0.734 1.660
HERFINDAHLBYINDUSTRYbtͲ1 0.274 0.049 *** Ͳ0.274 0.118 ** 0.121 0.076 0.124 0.082 0.664 0.195 ***
RegionandIndustryEffects no no yes no no yes
FirmFixedEffects yes yes no no no no
BankFixedEffects no yes no no no no
MonthFixedEffects no yes no no no no
BankͲMonthFixedEffects no no yes no no no
FirmͲMonthFixedEffects no no no yes no no
LoanFixedEffects no no no no yes no
No.Observations 562,020 562,020 813,115 155,167 134,445 42,029
No.ofClustersandLevelofClustering 106,466 Firm 106,466 Firm 8,399 BankͲMonth 68,228 FirmͲMonth 62,483 Loan No
SamplePeriod 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12
Logpseudolikelihood Ͳ236,186 Ͳ232,060 Ͳ510,723 Ͳ54,898 Ͳ46,735 Ͳ28,090
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TABLE 4. CONDITIONS, CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY, AND CREDIT SUBSTITUTION  
The estimates this table lists are based on conditional logit models. The dependent variable is AT LEAST ONE 
LOAN APPLICATION IS GRANTEDit which equals one if firm i applies for a loan at time t and one or more 
loans are granted in month t to t+3 by any bank, and equals zero if firm i applies for a loan at time t but did not 
obtain any loans in t to t+3. The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1. The bank 
characteristics are those of the average bank the firm either borrows from or gets rejected by. Subscripts indicate 
the time of measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 2002:M2 – 2008:M12. For each model 
coefficients are listed in the first column and standard errors clustered at the firm level are between parentheses 
in the second column. Significance levels are in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
 
I II III
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPt 20.985 1.061 *** 56.097 8.412 ***
ȴGDPt*Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) Ͳ13.026 3.017 *** Ͳ17.099 3.052 ***
ȴGDPt*Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) Ͳ47.646 20.776 ** Ͳ41.239 20.603 **
ȴGDPt*FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 Ͳ9.114 2.451 *** Ͳ8.263 2.457 ***
ȴGDPt*BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ39.351 16.469 ** 0.118 17.440
ȴIRt Ͳ12.851 1.332 *** Ͳ26.550 7.570 ***
ȴIRt*Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) Ͳ1.074 3.609 5.701 3.666
ȴIRt*Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) 5.630 16.943 10.857 17.114
ȴIRt*FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 8.511 2.974 *** 7.017 2.982 **
ȴIRt*BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 52.196 14.949 *** 40.614 16.878 **
ȴCPIt Ͳ1.146 0.689 * Ͳ0.768 0.694
Firmcharacteristics(i)
Ln(FIRMCAPITALRATIOitͲ1) 0.173 0.058 *** 0.588 0.112 *** 0.754 0.114 ***
FIRMLIQUIDITYRATIOitͲ1 0.038 0.042 0.315 0.087 *** 0.297 0.087 ***
Ln(TOTALASSETSitͲ1) 0.131 0.017 *** 0.132 0.017 *** 0.144 0.017 ***
Ln(1+AGEitͲ1) 0.011 0.034 0.016 0.035 0.200 0.039 ***
ROAitͲ1 0.241 0.075 *** 0.244 0.075 *** 0.198 0.075 ***
I(DOUBTFULLOANSATTHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.906 0.080 *** Ͳ0.892 0.080 *** Ͳ0.889 0.080 ***
I(DOUBTFULLOANSBEFORETHETIMEOFTHEREQUESTitͲ1) Ͳ0.486 0.065 *** Ͳ0.472 0.065 *** Ͳ0.456 0.065 ***
Ln(1+No.MONTHSWITHTHEBANKibtͲ1) 0.071 0.009 *** 0.071 0.009 *** 0.070 0.009 ***
Ln(1+NUMBEROFBANKRELATIONSHIPSibtͲ1) Ͳ0.025 0.023 Ͳ0.022 0.023 Ͳ0.013 0.023
Industrycharacteristics(s)
INDUSTRYDOUBTFULLOANSRATIOstͲ1 Ͳ9.138 3.364 *** Ͳ8.201 3.382 ** Ͳ10.717 3.478 ***
Provincecharacteristics(p)
Ln(No.BANKSptͲ1) 0.453 0.111 *** 0.456 0.111 *** 0.290 0.114 **
Characteristicsofthemeanlendingorrejectingbank(b)
ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) 0.498 0.160 *** 2.005 0.707 *** 1.601 0.701 **
BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ0.092 0.150 1.204 0.552 ** Ͳ0.386 0.590
Ln(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) 0.022 0.009 ** 0.023 0.009 *** 0.045 0.009 ***
ROAbtͲ1 0.117 1.842 0.212 1.869 4.437 1.984 **
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 1.366 1.374 2.131 1.412 1.263 1.479
HERFINDAHLBYINDUSTRYbtͲ1 Ͳ0.313 0.164 * Ͳ0.255 0.166 0.450 0.180 **
FirmFixedEffects yes yes yes
MonthFixedEffects no no yes
No.Observations 240,107 240,107 240,107
No.ofClustersandLevelofClustering 56,387 Firm 56,387 Firm 56,387 Firm
SamplePeriod 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12 2002:M2Ͳ2008:M12
Logpseudolikelihood Ͳ88,200 Ͳ88,157 Ͳ87,948
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TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The table lists the variables employed in the second set of empirical specifications and provides their mean, standard deviation, minimum, 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, and 
maximum. Units and definition are provided in Table 1. The number of observations equals 9,983,463 for all variables. The sample period equals 1988:Q2 – 2008:Q4. 
 
 
Mean SD Min P25 Median P75 Max
Dependentvariable
ȴLN(LOANCREDITibt) Ͳ0.01 0.48 Ͳ12.08 Ͳ0.09 0.00 0.01 12.08
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPtͲ1 3.28 1.29 Ͳ1.67 2.70 3.56 3.97 5.82
ȴIRtͲ1 Ͳ0.36 1.71 Ͳ7.78 Ͳ1.24 Ͳ0.01 0.61 4.59
ȴCPItͲ1 3.64 1.27 1.41 2.68 3.50 4.34 7.07
Characteristicsofthemeanbank(b)
Ln(BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1) 1.75 0.34 Ͳ0.62 1.51 1.69 1.96 4.53
BANKCAPITALRATIObtͲ1 6.10 2.40 0.54 4.52 5.43 7.10 92.56
BANKLIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 25.93 13.31 0.17 15.06 25.26 35.25 96.42
Ln(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) 17.02 1.65 8.15 15.95 17.14 18.27 19.86
TOTALASSETSbtͲ1 68,400 90,300 3 8,455 27,800 86,200 422,000
ROAbtͲ1 1.16 0.74 Ͳ16.38 0.72 1.00 1.46 9.42
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 2.54 3.50 0.00 0.60 1.20 2.93 100.00
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TABLE 6. CONDITIONS, CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY, AND THE INTENSIVE MARGIN OF LENDING 
The estimates this table lists are based on ordinary least squares models. The dependent variable is ǻLN(LOAN CREDITibt) which is the change in nominal outstanding 
credit of firm i granted by bank b during quarter t. The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 1, their descriptive statistics are in Table 5. Subscripts indicate 
the time of measurement of each variable. The sample period equals 1988:Q2 – 2008:Q4. For each model coefficients are listed in the first column and the standard errors 
clustered at the bank-month level between parentheses are in the second column. The significance levels are in the third column. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, 
* significant at 10%.  
 
 
I II III IV
Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E.
Macroeconomicconditions(t)
ȴGDPtͲ1 2.415 0.310 *** 3.573 0.340 ***
ȴGDPtͲ1*CAPITALRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ2.964 0.689 *** Ͳ4.135 0.738 *** Ͳ1.680 0.654 ** Ͳ2.101 0.845 **
ȴGDPtͲ1*LIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ1.978 0.432 *** Ͳ3.372 0.452 *** Ͳ0.483 0.470 Ͳ0.641 0.580
ȴIRtͲ1 Ͳ0.781 0.223 *** Ͳ1.775 0.228 ***
ȴIRtͲ1*CAPITALRATIObtͲ1 1.058 0.471 ** 1.795 0.476 *** 0.767 0.427 * 1.103 0.546 **
ȴIRtͲ1*LIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 0.594 0.313 * 2.083 0.321 *** Ͳ0.221 0.350 Ͳ0.282 0.432
ȴCPItͲ1 Ͳ0.124 0.059 ** 0.330 0.063 ***
Characteristicsofthebank(b)
CAPITALRATIObtͲ1 0.100 0.026 *** 0.163 0.028 *** 0.050 0.024 ** 0.067 0.030 **
LIQUIDITYRATIObtͲ1 0.059 0.015 *** 0.173 0.016 *** Ͳ0.004 0.018 Ͳ0.004 0.021
LN(TOTALASSETSbtͲ1) Ͳ0.001 0.000 *** Ͳ0.003 0.000 *** Ͳ0.001 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000
ROAbtͲ1 0.031 0.078 0.190 0.086 ** 0.105 0.071 0.041 0.095
DOUBTFULLOANSRATIObtͲ1 Ͳ0.053 0.018 *** 0.048 0.021 ** Ͳ0.070 0.022 *** Ͳ0.008 0.026
QuarterFixedEffects no no yes no
FirmFixedEffects no yes no no
FirmͲQuarterFixedEffects no no no yes
No.Observations 9,983,463 9,983,463 9,983,463 9,983,463
No.ofClustersandLevelofClustering 16,588 BankͲQuarter 16,588 BankͲQuarter 16,588 BankͲQuarter 16,588 BankͲQuarter
Period 1988:Q2Ͳ2008:Q4 1988:Q2Ͳ2008:Q4 1988:Q2Ͳ2008:Q4 1988:Q2Ͳ2008:Q4
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